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ART. IV. — *Empirical Psychology; or, The Human Mind as given in Consciousness.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D. New York: Ivison and Phinney. 1856.

OF this work, first published two years since, there has just appeared a new edition. As it is no mere compend or digest of previous knowledge, but has in it much that is bold and peculiar, it deserves and will justify more than a passing notice. There is not in it that careful and detailed discussion of particular mental powers which we find in Stewart and other authors; but there is, in its place, a general survey and classification more radical and complete than any hitherto presented.

The acquisition of particulars, however important, is always of less moment than the possession of that broad view which presents an entire subject in its fundamental characteristics and abiding distinctions, and which makes the survey of the parts yet more pleasurable and profitable, by first giving their relations in one whole. A single radical idea, in which particulars are grouped, and by which they are explained, bears us further towards true science, and gives us greater facility in acquiring and possessing the field before us, than the most laborious explorations and discussions of one or another of its detached portions. If this work has left much ground unoccupied, it has yet spread the outline of its survey over the whole. There is no elaborate and graceful completion of parts, but a strong, bold sketching of leading features.

The first division of mental phenomena is threefold, into those of the Intellect, the Susceptibility, and the Will; a triplicity which the author sustains in all his leading subdivisions. The Intellect, or the capacity of knowing, is again divided into the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason. This division will detain us for a moment.

What a vast amount of discussion lies behind these three words, — Sense, Understanding, and Reason, — words which a single breath can utter, and which, once uttered and understood, have in them all the clearness and conviction of truth!

There are not many more apt illustrations of the axiom, that single words thoroughly understood and well defined may contain and retain for future use conceptions which it has cost the best minds, in their successive efforts, ages to realize. What caskets of wealth and of wisdom are those terms which science, from amid the struggles of opinions and the throes of the human mind, is able, from time to time, to render as its offspring to the waiting world! Gravitation, Affinity, Polarity, Reason, are each words that comprehend and measure the results of the most powerful and continuous efforts of an incalculable series of the greatest intellects.

Human knowledge is not homogeneous, — a mere accumulation of acquisitions obviously derived from the world about us. Our most simple judgments are complex, nor does the mind readily detect their parts, or the sources from which these parts are severally derived. It is not till the mind is capable of well-sustained and subtle effort, that it even finds itself prompted to resolve its thought into its elements, and to refer these elements to their appropriate faculties.

The proposition, The apple is spherical, will, in analysis, fall into three parts, each given to the mind by a distinct faculty. Considering the apple simply as made known to the eye in color, we have in the mind, as our first element, a perception. This perception, which is the subject of our proposition, is reached by the mind acting through the medium of sensation, and the mind, thus acting, constitutes the sense. The predicate of our proposition contains the idea of form, which is itself but a modification of the idea of space, being nothing more than the relations in space which the superficial particles of a body bear to one another. The idea of this special form, that of a sphere, being but a modification of the general idea of space, is our second element, and is not given to us through sensation, but on the occasion of sensation is brought forward by the reason as the appropriate idea by which the phenomenon is to be understood in its external relations in space. But these two — the perception given in the sense, the idea given in the reason — are united in a proposition, — the one being affirmed of the other. This act, by which we reach a conclusion, a judgment, is that of the understanding, and constitutes our third element.

So also in the expression, The apple is produced by the tree, we have the same phenomenal element, united in a judgment with the idea of production or causation, furnished by the reason; and by this idea, the apple, as a present existence, is explained in its causal relations as the effect of something which has gone before it.

Thus it is with all our knowledge. It pertains to the external, the phenomenal, but is not solely given by it or constituted from it. The mind, acting intuitively in the reason, furnishes on the demand of an occasion the appropriate ideas by which the phenomena are united and made coherent in their several relations of time, space, resemblance, and those others which are necessary to make the world the orderly, intelligible product of complete wisdom.

The office of the understanding, acting in memory, conception, association, abstraction, judgment, is to take all the phenomena given us in the sense, and to combine them with, and understand them by, their corresponding ideas furnished in the reason. This process is reasoning, and if it be correct reasoning, the product is knowledge. The correlation between the sensations and the grouping, explaining ideas, is like that between matter and form, — between the plan and the details of the plan, — between the thought and the vocal sounds that give utterance to the thought, — between the divine conception and the creations which made that conception external and real.

The reason is that faculty by which nature becomes a language to us, suggesting ideas, and comprehended and explained in ideas. It is to the world what the antiquarian is to the cipher: it furnishes the key by which the whole is transformed from mere appearances, resting in the sense, into knowledge, occupying and gratifying the understanding. By the animal, the carvings on an obelisk are not apprehended as aught different from the marks of time on its surface; but give him reason, and he immediately seeks something back of them by which he may unite and explain them. The sensational world is to man a cipher, and as the fundamental ideas of the solution have already been given to him, there remains, as his high mission, their complete and diverse ap-

plication. Here the understanding busies itself, and the reason struggles to furnish it that apt modification of the idea of cause or resemblance which may unlock the mystery. The animal sees all things in space, and experiences them in time, but distinguishes them not from the space in which they abide, or from the time through which they exist. But man, gifted with reason, instantly apprehends things in their obvious space and time relations, and, by a careful and mathematical application of what is given in these primary ideas, learns to understand the universe in all its multiplied forms, movements, positions, and sequences. So, too, in causation, the world is not able even to suggest an inquiry to a mind not endowed with reason; but the mind so endowed takes this fundamental idea, and goes forth to explain, with a variety of conceptions and applications, mechanical, physical, and vital phenomena. Under the suggestions of experiment, and by the proofs of experiment, it insures its progress, till gradually the idea is made to settle down into the phenomena, as a thought into the characters which give it utterance.

Early in the history of philosophy, the distinction between the two parts of knowledge furnished, the one by the reason, and the other by the sense, was apprehended, though not well understood or clearly defined. Philosophers, misled in part by the early success which attended mathematics, and by the independence of experience which belongs to investigations in that department, were willing to look for a corresponding growth of ideal sciences through the unfolding of their parts from the primitive conception which enclosed them. But mathematics, with its few and simple ideas, and these considered only in their fixed numerical relations, can never be taken as an example of the true method of progress in other departments. Every purely ideal system, possessing itself of the form rather than of the substance of knowledge, has quickly, by the remote and empty character of its formulæ, so far separated itself from things and facts as to perish in its own sterility of results. A reaction from this undue and dangerous estimate of ideas has more than once forced the mind of man, in its progress towards truth, into assigning to sensation and experience a position, as sources of knowledge,

correspondingly dangerous. We can no more fly, winged of sense alone, than winged of reason alone; the two, with answering parts and corresponding powers, must sustain the mind in its acquiring and knowing. The universality and necessity of those ideas which come to us through the reason, have ever baffled the explanation of mere experience.

Sensation, far from giving us those notions which make its phenomena orderly and comprehensible, can, as the material of knowledge, exist only by their means, and without them would be as empty of truth as the reflection in the mirror or in the eye of the animal. The hand may move for ever along the outline of an object, yet, unless there already exists in the mind the idea of direction, and of change of direction by which the movement is guided and made intelligible, no idea of form will thereby be given. Between these two extremes, philosophy has oscillated; and that classification alone is radical and valuable which assigns the two elements of knowledge to their appropriate faculties, and makes them both minister to the processes of the understanding.

The next important division of our author is that of the susceptibilities into the animal, rational, and spiritual. The first two of these classes arise naturally from the previous divisions of the intellect;—the animal emotions springing up on the occasions given by the sense and the understanding; the rational, on the occasions given by the reason;—and these two would seem to cover the whole ground, as no feeling can arise except in connection with some intellectual action, and the sources of intellectual action are now exhausted.

Man is possessed of a free will,—is able to accept or reject certain ends of action. In the permanent choice of an end, he places himself in harmony with all that is included in that end, and in hostility with all that is excluded. This voluntary disposing of the soul our author terms a spiritual disposition, and finds in it “an independent source of feeling, and thus occasion for a distinct sphere of susceptibility.” The spiritual susceptibility has its source in the personal disposition, and is utterly exclusive of all that belongs to constitutional nature, whether of the animal or rational.” Of these spiritual emotions, the clearest illustrations given are those of

Christian love and faith. The will having accepted in obedience the law of God, there is immediately given the occasion for new emotions, and the emotions of a heart going forth in love and faith are those termed *spiritual*.

Such, so far as we understand it, is the basis of the third division of the susceptibilities, and in it we confess ourselves unable to discover any clear or valid distinction. That the spiritual emotions are preceded by an act of the will as a condition, though not as an efficient cause or occasion of their existence, can constitute no such distinction. In the animal emotions, it is not the qualities simply that draw forth our feelings, but those qualities in their relations to ourselves, our plans, our purposes. These relations depend sometimes on our volitions, and sometimes not; sometimes on permanent, and sometimes on wayward purposes; but whatever be the occasions of the relations in which qualities present themselves to us, it is evident that these occasions constitute no valid basis for classification, since the emotions do not spring up in view of *them*, but in view of *objects* sustaining, by means of them, new relations. The bear in the forest may be an object of fear; in the cage, of curiosity. Here, there is a change, not of object, but of relation, and that not by our act, but by the act of another. This hour we propose to spend in pleasure, and the friend that comes on business is now unwelcome, while he that seeks enjoyment is welcome; the next hour we devote to business, and the emotions are reversed on the appearance of the same persons. The character of God is perfect, fitted to call forth love; but we have opposed ourselves to his law; our plans and the attributes of God are in mutual hostility; the selfish heart, clinging to its own wilful gratifications, is able, with anger and resentment, to reject all that opposes its sinful purposes, and thus, with a constitutional ability of appreciating and loving the excellence of God's character, it excludes love by the stronger and antagonistic passions kindled in view of its own ends of action. At a later period, the heart submits itself to God; the barrier of transgression being now broken down, and conflicting passions driven out, the intellect readily apprehends, and the heart cheerfully responds to, the excellences before rejected.

In these instances, the emotion is modified by the relation in which we stand to the object of emotion; yet, in all of them, the constitutional susceptibility existed previously to the relation, and was waiting to be called forth on the fitting occasion.

If, then, our classification rests in part on the character of the object of emotion, whether it be given in the sense or in the reason, it must rest wholly upon that character; we cannot suddenly forsake this criterion, and establish a third class upon a new one. Certainly this is true when the new criterion would run through and destroy our two previous divisions, since many, both of our animal and rational emotions, as already seen, are preceded and modified in their occasions by some act of the will.

Under this division of spiritual susceptibility, friendship is also given in illustration.

“Among individuals there may be kindred interests, pursuits, and constitutional temperaments; and these may render two, or any number of them, mutually congenial to each other, and the intercourse of such may be intimate and highly agreeable. But when there has been a decided commitment of soul, and a reciprocal flowing out of the spirit each to each, there is in this a union of dispositions; and at once a cordiality of feeling springs up, much deeper and sweeter than all the congenialities of common interest or similar temperament.”

Separating the philosophy from the rhapsody of this passage, we yet fail to see at what point the emotion of friendship is suddenly transmuted from a rational into a spiritual emotion. So far as feeling arises from mere convenience and a calculation of advantages, it is an animal emotion, and not friendship; but when it springs from the higher qualities of beauty, truth, and virtue, given in the reason, and, by the apprehension of those qualities as existing in a living person, goes out in love to that person, it is then a rational emotion, and, if reciprocated, is the basis of what we term friendship. No act of the will, by which friends are set apart to each other, can otherwise modify this emotion than by giving to it a fuller, freer play. Animal feelings may indeed mingle with the rational, and our satisfaction may be increased by a secret sense of exclusive possession; but these are not of the essence

of the relation. This seems to us to lie solely in the emotions of admiration and love, drawn forth in view of high rational qualities, and thus, with or without a "commitment of soul," to be neither other than, nor different from, a constitutional, rational emotion.

The qualities which are the objects of emotion are given us through the sense and through the reason. In animal emotions, — setting aside that sympathy by which we are made partakers of the feelings of others, — the objects of sense, in their relations to our enjoyments and plans, are the things contemplated; and hence, as the occasions of these feelings are given wholly in our animal constitution, they are rightly termed *animal*. The qualities, on the other hand, given to us in the reason, are not only reached through this nobler mental power, but are able to kindle our emotions by what and for what they are in themselves, wholly aside from personal relations. It is an excellency that now occupies us, and not a gratification. The rational emotions, springing from qualities belonging to the reason everywhere, which are identical, necessary, and universal in all rational existence, are separated by a broad gulf from those transitory emotions which accompany our sentient existence.

As the understanding reveals no qualities to the mind, it cannot itself be the independent source of any emotion; but it may employ itself, now in unfolding the properties and relations of external objects, thus giving breadth and strength to sensuous feeling, now in unfolding the connections of truth or virtue, thus helping to kindle a higher life of feeling. But beyond these, we have no further source of emotion.

The only remaining division that invites attention is that of the Will, into Immanent Preferences, Governing Purposes, and Desultory Volitions. The term "preference" does not refer to taste or inclination, but designates a "proper election," and is termed immanent as lying in the mind "without any overt manifestation." "It was in thine heart to build an house to my name." A purpose is an election of a general end of action, and, as abiding in the mind, prompting and guiding the successive executive acts by which the end is reached, it is named the governing purpose. "Turn-

ing aside from the main end, while the governing purpose towards it is not renounced, is termed a desultory volition."

These divisions, as now explained, though marking differences, are yet open to some criticism. They seem to mark not so much kinds of volitions, as the relations in which the volitions stand to the action and character of the person putting them forth. A governing purpose and a desultory volition are equally "elections," and, as elections, differ from each other by no fixed characteristic. The number of executive acts, by which a governing purpose completes itself, can be no such characteristic, as a desultory volition must also often include subsidiary acts, and this fluctuating number can never constitute a distinction of kind, and not always even of degree. The real difference marked by these two classes seems, as we have intimated, to lie between volitions, in their relations to the disposition and character of the person whose they are. Those by which a given disposition is secured, or which are in the direction of that disposition, are governing purposes; those aside from, or opposed to, that disposition, are desultory volitions. That which is a governing purpose in one individual may, in another, be a desultory volition, and thus, with every change of relation,—with every transition from person to person,—it may shift its name backward and forward, while remaining intrinsically the same. So, also, the immanent preference of one may become the governing purpose of another. David has it in his heart, and Solomon has it in hand, to build the house of the Lord.

Aside from the fact that these divisions seem to fall short of marking real distinctions in mental acts, they are not made in reference to the same point, and hence overlap and include one another. An immanent preference relates to the manifestation or suspension of the volition, and as all volitions are either manifested or suspended, the whole field is covered by immanent and manifest preferences. Again, a governing purpose and a desultory volition have reference to the disposition of the individual, the one securing and the other thwarting the disposition; and here the whole field is a second time covered. The point of classification being thus shifted,

the divisions will blend with one another, and an immanent preference, for aught we see, may be either an incipient governing purpose or a desultory volition.

These criticisms may, at least, show that the classification, in this part of the work, is not marked with entire clearness and firmness.

The portion of the subject that seems especially to have drawn out the power of the author, to evince most clearly the strength and vigor of his thought, and to reward the reader most abundantly by the rich and suggestive character of the ideas presented, is that pertaining to the will and the freedom of its actions. In no department of knowledge is a true conception more important or more difficult to be reached. In none has the labor of the best minds so often served solely to mislead, tending to results the most intolerable and disastrous, by arguments apparently unanswerable. No conception, whether true or erroneous, so colors and modifies all our thinking, as this of the will. It stands broadly related with all departments of action, and through these relations it everywhere leaves its traces of a dreary necessity and dark fatality, or of freedom and hope.

Necessity and chance are opposites and extremes. Nature, in the flow of all her events, alike in her vital and in her mechanical processes, is necessitated. The present is but a medium, receiving its power from the past and bearing it on to the future. Each point, each force, is a point, is a force in the stream, caused and causing—first pressed and then pressing. Thought and feeling even, as they float on this current, have no power over it, and are themselves conditioned in their action by it. The stream, and the driftwood eddying, lingering, lodging, floating on its surface in sportive freedom, are yet swept on by the same irresistible causal power to ends, in all their accidents, fixed and unchangeable. Nature knows nothing beyond herself; she draws all things into her ceaseless flow, and explains all things in these, their necessitated relations. Chance, on the other hand, cuts asunder every relation, loosens every bond, and denies all certainty. Is there any ground between these two, or aside from these two? If not, then is freedom impossible, and a will in freedom a de-

lusive phantom, inviting and mocking pursuit. Our only escape from chance—from mere fortuity by which nothing is to be reached—is into the meshes of necessity, dragging us to one end, and one end only, whether of life or of death.

A free will must, in action, be at once without chance and without necessity; with all the certainty of law, and none of its indissoluble connections. The will must be able to act, at once, orderly and freely, uncontrolled and self-controlling, affected, yet unconstrained, by the pressure of motives. The links of necessity are to be broken asunder; its certainty and order are not thereby to escape us. The conception which should contain this idea of will in freedom, it is evident, can never and should never render itself up to a logical criticism, or suffer an explanation to pass through it by a purely logical process. Such a process can proceed only along the links of fixed and causal relations,—can move only in the stream of nature; and hence, all that it lays hold of, and passes over, it inevitably presses down and sinks into that stream. This would be to suffer our explanations to destroy our conceptions, and to throw away with one hand what we had just secured with the other. A free will, if the terms *free* and *freedom* are not wholly illusory, is something supernatural,—above and beyond the flow of nature; and therefore no explanation which is itself of nature, and shares the necessity of nature, can be flung, like a net, upon it, except to drag it down and destroy it. It is the very condition of our effort that we rise above nature, and hence we cannot, in that very effort, keep within her fixed logical relations.

The idea of freedom, the alternative alike of necessity and of chance, is to the human reason not an absurdity, and while, from the very nature of the case, unable to render a complete explanation of the conception, we may yet define the Will as “the capacity for electing.” This definition justifies itself to the common consciousness of men. Indeed, this common consciousness has ever been the citadel of freedom, from which the most subtle devices and enginery of logicians have not been able to expel it. Men are everywhere haunted with the conviction of having been able to do better than they

have actually done, and the whole burden of guilt comes and can come to the human mind only in connection with a clear and well-defined consciousness that each step in the descent was one of choice. No reasoning has ever been able to break down in the minds of men the axiom of morals, that responsibility is measured by ability. The strength of this common consciousness is also clearly seen in the reluctance with which the philosophy of necessity approaches its own conclusions; the subtle phraseology with which it seeks to modify or partially conceal its results; its efforts to restore, or seem to restore, with one hand, what it has destroyed with the other; the pertinacity with which it insists on a valid, vital distinction between inabilities, when it can no longer mark that distinction; and the tenacity with which it clings to those technical terms, which afford a thin haze in which to shelter the naked idea. No less is it seen in the firmness with which the opposing philosophy has held to its convictions, though sadly worsted in the argument, and utterly unable to explain its conceptions. Our definition is also justified, when we look at the objects between which man in his free action is called to elect. They are not the same in kind, and therefore admit of no comparison in degree. An object of appetite, making its appeal through the sense, and the law of right, through the reason, cannot be brought to the same scale of measurement, and thus be found the one to overlap the other. Heat, in its degrees, cannot be flung into the balance against weight and its degrees. Certainly, these are not more distinct in kind, more incommensurable, than are gratification and right. Nor can these two, gratification and right, be resolved into happiness, and thus applied to a common scale. Right can never be so resolved; and he who does right on the ground of the pleasure secured, has not yet done right. Two objects, wholly distinct, without the possibility of comparison in degree, exclude necessity as springing from the presence of motives, and leave election possible. The expression, "The strongest motive controls the will," may be either a mere truism, meaning nothing more than that the will is governed by the motive by which it actually is governed, or it may be an effort to assign a definite power to

motives, and thus, by a surreptitious introduction of the idea of force into the realm of freedom, to render a comparison in degree possible. The moment we accept the effort as legitimate, the whole field is abandoned, and all sinks back into necessity.

Comparisons drawn from the external world, having ever in them the antagonistic connections of necessity, will not only fail to enlighten, but must necessarily mislead us in our discussions upon freedom; but there are analogies drawn from a higher source, which, if they do not illustrate a free will, yet show the necessity of the conception, and prove that it shares its most perplexing difficulties with other generally admitted ideas. Man can never attribute to God any freedom higher and purer in kind than that which he first finds in himself. It is solely because the image of God is within us, that we are able to find and comprehend the substantial being of God without us. The moment that we deny freedom to ourselves on the ground of any impossibility in the conception, that moment we deny it to God, and heaven and earth at once sink into the unmeasured, uncontrolled stream of causation. There is no more any supernatural. In destroying himself, man wrecks the whole universe. It remains no longer the offspring and the theatre of self-guiding action; but a deluge of physical causes, rushing down through the infinity of the past, sweeps over and swallows up all its outposts and battlements. Freedom lost and consistency maintained, there will remain above the flood not a single mountain-top on which the temple or city of our God might rest. If this all-consuming idea of causation is to eat like a worm into the heart of our free philosophy, then we shall find in time or space no position or barrier which we may make good against it. As we travel back along the line of events, searching for some ultimate point, some first fountain from which the phenomenal universe has been poured forth, we shall have everywhere beneath our feet the same conditions that we now have, — force, pressed on and pressing onward. Cause beneath us, cause behind us, cause before us, — every point precisely analogous to every other point in the dreary waste of causa-

tion, we shall strive in vain to stop; our weariness will be our only evidence that we have reached our journey's end. To assume a first cause is both an assumption and a misnomer;—an assumption, because it is the arbitrary suspension of a process which, to be consistent with itself, ought to go on for ever; the same impulse that compels me to seek a cause for one cause, should compel me to seek a cause for every other cause;—a misnomer, since, while the term is retained, one half the idea it should cover is cast away. It is not less essential to the complete conception that it be caused, than that it be a cause,—that it receive force, than that it impart it. There is nothing of origination in the idea of causation with which Logic deals. Beginning, creation, is, to her, thin air, out of which she can make nothing, on which she can construct nothing. Put the chasm where you will on the last of her veritable causes, she will stand astonished, impotent, and angered. The whole process, then, by which we reach and retain the idea of a Creator, is in direct contravention and hostility to all merely logical methods; and the act of the mind by which we refuse to seek a cause for the one great Creator is precisely analogous to that by which we refuse to run over and destroy our idea of freedom by our idea of force. The same analogy may also be seen in some of the attributes we assign to God. We feel it no absurdity to say of him, He is ubiquitous; yet a very little explanation may make this attribute seem to the mere understanding both impossible and absurd. The truth is, our reason is able to give us ideas beyond the measurement of merely logical processes.

In the work some of whose prominent ideas have now been partially discussed, there are to be found, scattered with a liberal hand, those fresh, vigorous, and suggestive thoughts which open to the mind new fields, quicken its action, and connect and consolidate its fragmentary knowledge. In this respect, we doubt whether it has its equal. But the synthetic and originating power of the author seems to surpass his analytical capacity. Taken as a complete compend of the science of the mind designed for students, it lacks that clear and careful treatment of the parts which would make

it, not an outline, but an adequate physical chart, of the region surveyed. Thus, Association is confined to three pages, Memory and Conception each to two pages, and Abstraction to one.

The works of Dr. Hickok have not everywhere received that candid and cheerful appreciation which would naturally flow from a full insight into their merits. This is owing, we think, in great part, to the style in which they are written. He does not merely employ technical terms, — these belong to all scientific productions, and, when clearly defined and accurately employed, are very far from leading to obscurity, — but his whole form of thought and mode of expression are generally more or less, and at times extremely, technical and artificial. One needs to read his books through, before the mind is placed in such sympathy with the mind of the author, its method of operation and expression, as clearly and readily to apprehend his full idea. This is true of those accustomed to metaphysical research; much more must it be true of those undisciplined in that direction. This apparent unintelligibleness, which has withheld the meaning from the hasty, the careless, and the lazy reader, has repelled many; and none but the craving appetite has been quickened and satisfied. The newspaper criticism on the author's Rational Psychology, that it could be read as well backwards as forwards, has found many willing to shield their indolence by ridicule. In this respect, the work before us deserves, and will encounter, some criticism, especially as designed for a class of persons to whom no unnecessary and fastidious difficulty should be presented. Of the technical method, which pervades not words, but sentences, the following may be given as illustrations.

“This identification of the reciprocal modifications, of both the recipient organ and that which has been received, is precisely what is meant by sensation.”

“Shape is given limit in extent, and tone is given limit in intensity; and as thus limited, we may apply to both shape and tone a common term expressive of the limitation, and call it *form*. The living feeling will thus always be expressed in some pure form.”

All the passages in connection with the above require a

certain quick sympathy with the methods of the author for their ready and perfect apprehension. In no department of composition should style be so simply and solely a medium for thought, as in the productions of philosophy. Its foremost excellence, therefore, must be that transparency which interposes no obstacle, which conceals and alters nothing.

Poetry, burdened with no search, exulting in the tread of her imagery as it comes echoing forth in her metre, may seek the mystic light which half gives, half conceals her passion; but Science must ever walk straight onward with her lamp in her hand. The telescope with which we search out obscure and complicated phenomena should possess that perfect symmetry and adjustment of lenses which distorts not the object, nor converts into shades and colors the pure beam of light along which the revelation comes. All imperfection here is so much added to our labor, — so much subtracted from our success. A definite purpose inspires and quickens our efforts, and that which is not an instrument is an obstacle.

ART. V. — *Modern Painters. Of Many Things.* By JOHN RUSKIN, M. A. Vol. III. New York: Wiley and Halsted. 1856.

THERE is perhaps no writer to whom America is more indebted than to John Ruskin. We have, on the one side, a materialism which tends to check the development of our higher nature; and, on the other, a spiritualism which would cast aside all outward form. Here, more than anywhere else, is needed the mediation of beauty, by which spirit and matter are blended into a living unity; by which the material loses its grossness, and the spiritual its vagueness. Works of art are too rare among us to exert a deep influence, and we are doubly grateful, therefore, to any one who will open our eyes to the beauty of the sky above us, and of the grass which we trample under our feet. We know of no